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Student Review
Marilynne Robinson, Absence of Mind: The Dispelling of Inwardness from the Modern Myth of the Self. New
Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2010. ISBN: 0300145187. Reviewed by Robert Minto, a senior philosophy
major and Kuyper Scholar at Dordt College.
In her newest book, Pulitzer prize-winning author
Marilynne Robinson intervenes in a debate that may seem
remote from her concerns as a novelist. She tells us she
wants to “examine one side in the venerable controversy
called the conflict between science and religion” (ix), and
she does so by examining the origin and argumentation
of what she calls “parascientific” literature. But in this
short book, via an argument as compact as her narrative
style is precise, she does much more than that: she also
contributes to the growing literature opposing the “New
Atheists,” makes a foray into intellectual history, and, most
importantly, implicitly defends the humanities, especially
literature, as irreplaceable disciplines in our overall attempt
to understand human nature.
Diverse heavy-hitters, such as Terry Eagleton and
David Bentley Hart,1 have responded to the popularity of
the “New Atheists,” to Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet,
and Christopher Hitchens, among others. But Robinson
does not stop at this popular polemic. Instead she treats
these men as the most recent iteration of a larger literature.
She treats their “scientific” atheism as one more instance of
illegitimate parascientific reasoning, and she strikes for the
root of the genre. Her rogue’s gallery also includes Darwin,
Thomas Malthus, Sigmund Freud, Auguste Comte, Richard
Rorty, B.F. Skinner, and E.O. Wilson. What connects them
is a shared conclusion and a shared methodology.
Robinson wishes to trace an expulsion that all these
thinkers have voted to be necessary in their different
(and incompatible) ways. “Mind,” they think, should be
expelled from our discourse. They all conclude that the
testimony of individual minds, the experience of human
subjectivity, should be explained away. (Throughout
her book, Robinson uses the word “mind” as a shorthand for humanly subjective experience; my usage will
imitate hers.) For example, Robinson examines how
neo-Darwinists attempt to account for human linguistic
complexity. In their account, verbal complexity evolved
for mating purposes such that eloquence had a sexual payoff. To this, Robinson replies that “charming as the notion
is that our proto-verbal ancestors found mates through
eloquent proto-speech,” such an etiology is absurdly blind
to how mates have been actually selected in recorded
history, during which “it has very rarely been the case
that people have had a pool of eligible others to select
among on the basis of some pleasing trait” (46). In order
to remain within the narrow walls of possible explanations
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for human experience, however, the neo-Darwinists have
to resort to treating the subjective experience of any
kind of altruism as a self-delusion. Robinson examines
numerous other instances of supposedly scientific rejection
of humanly subjective experience, but she doesn’t confine
herself to outraged summaries or sardonic comments.
She believes she can make out a common methodology.
This methodology is the glue that holds together the new
genre of “parascientific” literature that she presumes to
delineate.
Robinson describes the methodology like this:
“Some allusion to the science of the moment is used as
the foundation for extrapolations and conclusions that fall
far outside the broadest definitions of science” (43) and
yet claim the authority of science. So, for example, E.O.
Wilson extrapolates from his entomological research the
sociobiological claim that the human brain is purely an
instrument for survival, its operations explicable in those
terms. Or Malthus extrapolates, from “Peter Townsend’s
observations of overpopulation and starvation among
dogs stranded on an island stocked with sheep” (40), that
alleviating the starvation of Britain’s lower classes would
only make them worse off. Or Darwin extrapolates from
the biology of origins that Europeans are supreme.2 All of
these extrapolations require the exclusion of vast tracts of
subjective experience, require that we, in order to accept
them, mistrust the felt life of our minds. So the “absence of
mind” referred to in Robinson’s title is both the common
conclusion of the parascientific literature she examines and
also its common premise.
Even the profound and serious can fall into the
parascientific trap. Robinson devotes one whole chapter
to discussing Freud. She begins by recalling Freud’s wellknown interactions with his one-time disciple Jung, to
whom he insisted that they must never abandon the sexual
theory, according to which any kind of “spirituality”3
was explained as repressed sexuality. He told Jung they
must make of this theory “an unshakeable bulwark” (78).
Having thus established that Freud sometimes reasoned
parascientifically, Robinson surprises us again. Freud is
not to be classed with the figures discussed previously,
like Dawkins and Malthus. This is because “in a Europe
fascinated by notions of the radical importance of racial,
cultural, and national difference, Freud is creating another,
opposing anthropology, one that excludes these categories
altogether” (81). In place of the differences between “races”

and civilizations, he proposed the universality of a psyche
formed by the primal event of parricide. His oeuvre should
be interpreted as a radical political offering. It sinks, however,
to the level of the parascientific for posterity because we
ignore the historical (subjective!) context of Freud and
his conversation partners. Also, Robinson points out his
parascientific assumption that the unstable condition of his
Europe, and consequently the myth of the psyche by which
he explained and interpreted it, was normative. Freud was
one side of an “odd, post-metaphysical conversation, an
early instance of the conversation that is uniquely modern,”
so that while we may bless him for his political intentions,
we may also deplore the conversation as a whole because it
partook of the parascientific method and conclusion that
the mind is “not to be credited” (104). Robinson’s book
is probably worthwhile even just for this excursion into
intellectual history.
To return to Robinson’s initial claim that she is writing
about the conflict between science and religion, how does
the parascientific absence of mind relate to this conflict?
According to Robinson, this conflict is more rumored than
real. It has been most publicly perpetuated by parascientific
literature; consequently, it is not a conflict between
science and religion but between religion and illegitimate
extrapolations from science. Religion’s form of knowing is
one instance of the larger way of knowing that Robinson
relates to “mind.” It is the supreme humanly subjective
experience. Robinson goes to William James’s definition of
religion from his book The Varieties of Religious Experience
to argue that religion’s essence is solitary and inward.
Religion, in short, is the paramount function of mind;
if mind is self-deception, religion is the paramount selfdeception.4 Robinson’s book was collected from her Terry
Lectures at Yale, lectures annually delivered on the relation
of science and religion; but she performs a remarkable
rhetorical maneuver with this theme: the conflict of science
and religion turns out to be a front for a more pervasive
conflict, the conflict between parascience and “mind.”
While the careful reader may find Robinson’s own
analysis reductive at points—for instance, she uncarefully
periodizes and characterizes the “modern,” and she relies
upon William James’s dubious individualist understanding
of religion that seems to forget its social dimensions5—
on the whole she emerges in this book as a powerful
defender of the interpretive value of human subjectivity,

of a non-reductive account of the world. One feels, at
the end, an urge to return to her novels, her supremely
sensitive explorations of human subjectivity, equipped
with a theoretical understanding of their value. Thus,
while Absence of Mind at first appears remote from the
concerns of Robinson the novelist, its ultimate effect is to
rehabilitate humane studies, to demonstrate the necessity
of descriptions of mind, like her novels, for the study of
human nature.
						
Endnotes
1.

See Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the
God Debate, by Terry Eagleton, and Atheist Delusions:
The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies,
by David Bentley Hart.

2.

Robinson
distinguishes
between
Darwin’s
parascientific arguments and his legitimate scientific
work: so, for instance, between The Descent of Man
and The Origin of Species (52-53).

3.

Jung: “in the intellectual, not the supernatural sense”
(77).

4.

In fact, reminding us of the preference of Rev. John
Ames in her novel Gilead, Robinson writes that “if
I were not myself a religious person, but wished
to make an account of religion, I believe I would
tend toward the Feuerbachian view that religion is
a human projection of humanity’s conceptions of
beauty, goodness, power, and other valued things,
a humanizing of experience by understanding it as
structured around and mirroring back those values”
(127).

5.

She does attempt to deflect this criticism, arguing
that James’s focus upon individual accounts of inward
experience (which never include the experience of
corporate worship for example) takes place within a
denominational context and bears strong resemblance
to accounts that emerged from the two Great
Awakenings. But these observations don’t obviate the
fact that James considered religion an entirely private,
solitary, internal phenomenon.

Erratum:

In the June issue, see Laurence C. Sibley, Jr.’s review of James K. A. Smith’s Desiring the Kingdom: Worship,
Worldview, and Cultural Formation. The last line of the third paragraph should read, “His Desiring the Kingdom
argues that it is the heart that leads because it is the heart that hungers for and loves the kingdom; and imagines
what that kingdom might be” (32).
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